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MEDICAL CIVIL RIGHTS:
THE EXCLUSION OF PHYSICIANS OF
COLOR FROM MANAGED CARE:
BUSINESS OR BIAS?
RENE BOWSER*
Introduction
The United States is rapidly becoming more diverse, as
demonstrated by the fact that nonwhite racial and ethnic minorities
will likely constitute a majority of Americans later in this century.1
The representation of African Americans, Latino/as, Asian
Americans, and Native Americans in medicine, however, has grown
only modestly over the past 25 years, producing a trend in which
the proportion of minorities in the population outstrips their
representation among physicians by several fold. 2 Latino/as, for
example, comprise 14.4 percent of the U.S. population, 3 but only 3.2
percent of physicians. 4 Similarly, African Americans comprise
almost 13 percent of the population, 5 but only about 2.5 percent of
physicians. 6
Managed care organizations (MCOs) 7 are signing up growing
* Associate Professor, University of St. Thomas School of Law.
1. See IN THE NATION'S COMPELLING INTEREST: ENSURING DIVERSITY IN THE HEALTH-
CARE WORKFORCE 23 (Brian D. Smedley, Adrienne S. Butler & Lonnie R. Bristow eds.,
2003).
2. Id.
3. Population of the United States by Race and Hispanic/Latino Origin, Census
2000 and July 1, 2005, available at http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0762156.html (last
visited Nov. 20, 2006) [hereinafter Population]
4. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PHYSICIAN CHARACTERISTICS AND
DISTRIBUTION IN THE UNITED STATES 41 (2005) (showing Hispanics make up only 28,415
of the 871,535 U.S. physicians).
5. See Population, supra note 3.
6. See AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 4, at 41 (showing only 20,854
U.S. physicians are African American).
7. Managed care organizations provide health care finance and delivery through a
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numbers of minority patients, but few minority physicians appear
on the provider lists. Demographics are a major factor, of course,
and much legal and policy analysis has focused on ways of
increasing the pool of minority physicians. Another concern is that
MCOs' contracting decisions may be discriminatory based on the
characteristics of minority physicians or their patients. This article
focuses on non-supply related institutional norms and practices that
present significant barriers to entry for minority physicians.
Many physicians of color believe that MCOs disproportionately
reject their membership applications, terminate their contracts at a
much higher rate compared to white physicians, and unjustly "tax"
those patients of color wanting to receive medical care from a
physician of their own racial or ethnic background.8 In a 2003
Gallup survey of African-American physicians, almost 50 percent
indicated dissatisfaction with the treatment of African-American
physicians by managed care health plans.9 In another survey of
African-American doctors, 92 percent felt that MCOs terminate their
contracts more often than white physicians. 10
Managed care's selection and de-selection criteria appear
objective and race-neutral. However, while not purposely designed
to exclude, many of these criteria have had a significant adverse
impact on both minority physicians and the patients they serve. For
instance, practice in a large medical group is practically a
prerequisite to enter a managed care provider network. Yet, nearly
75 percent of African-American physicians are in solo practice."
In the end, the direct impact of exclusionary practices is felt by
patients of color. Patient choice in selecting physicians of like
background is severely restricted, ultimately compromising quality
health care. Studies show that minority patients use more services,
are more satisfied with health care and, in some instances, have
better outcomes when they receive care from physicians of their
confusing array of organizational structures, including health maintenance
organizations (HMOs), preferred provider organizations (PPOs), and integrated delivery
systems. Rather than focus on the taxonomy, Hacker and Marmor stress the three
essential features of MCOs-risk sharing between provider and insurer, administrative
oversight of clinical decisions, and the use of physician provider networks. See Jacob S.
Hacker and Theodore R. Marmor, How Not to Think About "Managed Care," 32 U. MICH. J.
L. REFORM 661 (1999).
8. See infra Part I.
9. See L. Natalie Carroll and Sharon Allison-Ottey, The Joy is Gone- Results of the
NMA/Gallup Survey of African-American Physicians, 96 J. NAT'L MED. ASS'N 419, 427
(2004).
10. See Risa Lavizzo-Mourey et al., The Perceptions of African-American Physicians
Concerning Their Treatment by Managed Care Organizations, 88 J. NAT'L. MED ASS'N. 210,
211-12 (1996).
11. See infra Part II.B.
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own racial or ethnic background. 12 In 2001, Dr. Rodney G. Hood
described the situation this way:
Thirty years ago, African-American physicians treated more than
90 percent of African Americans. Today, white physicians treat
two thirds of the African-American population. Some of that is by
choice, but a lot of it has to do with the African-American
population being disenfranchised from African-American
physicians. I've been in practice for over 20 years, and I can't tell
you the number of patients who wanted to choose me but
couldn't because I wasn't part of the health plan that covered
them. They tell me they have to go elsewhere, usually to a larger
group that may or may not have a physician that looks like
them.13
This article analyzes whether managed care is biased against
minority physicians in five sections. Part I looks at the allegations of
bias made by physicians of color and examines the statistical
evidence supporting the claims. Part II analyzes some of the norms
and practices of MCOs and suggests that many of these unwittingly
devalue the efficiency of minority physicians and the quality of care
they provide, which leads to inequitable actions and decisions.
Moreover, this part shows how exclusion from provider networks
potentially widens the racial health gap. Part III focuses on the
history of exclusion within the medical profession. This history is
important because it helped shape the organizational structure of
minority physician practices, dictated the types of patients they
served, influenced the location of their practices, and illustrates how
white physician self-interest continuously defeated the equity
demands of both minority patients and physicians.
The concluding two parts discuss remedies and legislative
reforms. Part IV focuses on remedies at the federal level and
analyzes the adequacy of existing civil rights laws and finds that
they are not well suited to redress discrimination in the medical
market. As an alternative to civil rights enforcement under existing
law, this article suggests that the problem of exclusion is better
addressed by revising health care quality mandates contained
within the Social Security Act to require the collection and analysis
of provider race and ethnicity data. Finally, Part V examines the
state and local remedies and legislative reforms, and suggests that
well-crafted provider panel diversity ordinances and physician due
12. See infra Part I.D.
13. Fighting Invisible Barriers To Equitable Health Care: A Conversation With Rodney G.
Hood, M.D., MANAGED CARE, February 2001, available at http://www.managedcaremag.
com/archives/0102/0102.qna-hood.html.
FALL 2006] MEDICAL CIVIL RIGHT'S
HASTINGS RACE AND POVERTY LAW JOURNAL
process statutes provide the most realistic avenues for relief.
I. Allegations of Discrimination in Provider Networks
Physicians of all races and ethnicities have long had a litany of
complaints against MCOs. Providers have complained about
interferences with medical decision-making, financial incentives to
render less care, and the burdensome administrative costs of
complying with plans' care management policies.' 4 Much less
publicized and more frequently ignored is the very serious
complaint of some African-America, Latino/a and Asian-American
physicians - MCOs effectively discriminate against them.
A. Allegations of Discrimination
In January 2000, the National Medical Association (NMA), the
nation's largest group of African-American physicians, alleged that
managed care health plans were excluding a disproportionate
number of minority physicians from physician provider networks
nationwide.15 Not only were health plans not accepting African-
American and Latino/a doctors, the health plans were also
terminating the contracts of some members. 16 According to the
NMA, in geographic areas in which managed care health plans are
the dominant form of health care delivery, some physicians of color
have ceased to be able to practice medicine, others have been forced
to relocate, and still others have been discouraged from establishing
practices.17
Physicians of color in Atlanta, Baltimore, Kansas City,
Cincinnati, Washington, D.C., and other cities have alleged that they
14. See, e.g., John Jacobi, After Managed Care: Gray Boxes, Tiers and Consumerism, 47 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 397 (2003).
15. See NewsHour: Race in Health Care (PBS television broadcast Jan. 25, 2000)
[hereinafter "Race In Health Care"], available at
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/health/jan-juneOO/race l-25.html; see also Walter
W. Shervington, Discrimination Among Major Health Plans Plague Nation's Minority
Physicians and Patients, 92 J. NAT.'L MED. ASS'N 103, 103 (2000).
16. See NewsHour, supra note 15; Shervington, supra note 15, at 104. The NMA
president Dr. Walter Shervington described the situation: "There are still too many black
and Latino doctors being kicked out of plans for no reason and too many black and
Latino physicians enrolled as patients in plans that do not allow access to physicians of
the same race." Id.
17. See NewsHour, supra note 15.
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had been locked out of provider networks. 18 Most recently, black
physicians practicing in Las Vegas held a May 18, 2005, press
conference to protest discriminatory managed care practices. 19 The
exclusion of blacks from MCO contracts was motivated by greed
and the desire to decrease the number of doctors competing for
patients, they stated.20 Because negotiation has not worked, the
group plans to file a class action lawsuit alleging race
discrimination. 21 Ten years earlier, black physicians had expressed
similar concerns before the Nevada State Legislature. 22 Speaking for
the group, Dr. James Tate testified that there was a definite lack of
acceptance of African-American physicians: "MCOs might accept
one or two family practitioners, but when it comes to specialists, the
usual answer would be that the MCOs had all the doctors they
needed." 23
America's Health Insurance Plans, a trade group representing
the managed care industry, denies that health plans consider race in
making physician selection and termination decisions. 24 Health
plans are actively recruiting physicians of color, according to the
group, and demographics are the major obstacle to provider
diversity. Furthermore, the association states that its members share
a commitment to delivering culturally competent care.25
A recent federal lawsuit illustrates the concerns. In 2000, eight
primary care physicians sued Humana and its local affiliate alleging
that Humana had unlawfully terminated them from a provider
network because of their race and ethnicity. 26 In their complaint, the
plaintiffs alleged that during the time in which Humana terminated
their contracts, all seventeen white physicians on the Humana panel
18. See, e.g., Gina Shaw, Are Managed Care Companies Squeezing Out Black Physicians?,
American Association of Medical Colleges Reporter, Apr. 2000, available at
http://www.aamc.org/newsroom/reporter/april2000/squeeze.htm; Cindy Starr, The
Disappearing Black Doctor, The Cincinnati Post, May 8, 1998, available at
http://cincypost.com/news/1998/docs060698.html.
19. Nevada Public Radio, DISCRIMINATION (KNBR audio broadcast May 18, 2005),
available at http:/www.knpr.org/archive/detailNEW.cfm?FeaturefD=2341.
20. Id. See also Cathy Scott, Black Physicians Accuse UMC of Racial Discrimination, May
12, 2005, available at http://www.lasvegascitylife.com/articles/2005/05/12/
localnews/news02.txt.
21. See Nevada Public Radio, supra note 19.
22. Nevada Senate Committee on Commerce and Labor, Sixty-eighth Session, Jan.
25,1995, available at http://www.leg.state.nv.us/68th/minutes/SCL125.txt.
23. Id.
24. See Shaw, supra note 18.
25. See, e.g., Stephanie L. Taylor et al., The Role of Cultural Competency in Reducing
Ethnic and Racial Healthcare Disparities, 10 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 4 (2004).
26. See Thiruchelvam v. Humana Health Insurance Plan, No. FL-M 6:00-cv-01542
(M.D. Fla. filed Nov. 16, 2000).
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remained with the MCO.27 The plaintiffs also alleged that after
terminating them, Humana rerouted their patients to the seventeen
white primary care physicians. 28
Humana answered that race and ethnicity had nothing to do
with the decision not to renew the contracts, and that the
terminations were for business reasons. 29  A Humana
spokeswoman, Pam Gadinsky, stated that the health plan wanted to
trim back the provider network. 30 She further indicated that each of
the eight physicians had "high deficits" and were unable to manage
in an HMO environment.31 According to Gadinsky: "There are
some doctors who are successful working in the managed care
setting, and some who are not." 32 In February 2003, Humana and
the plaintiffs settled the lawsuit for $3,200,000.33 As a result, the
district court did not reach the central issue of whether the
termination decisions were motivated by race or legitimate business
reasons. In the only other known case, Kansas City black doctors
settled with a local insurance company, acting as an MCO, after
alleging racially exclusionary practices.34
Some physicians of color have admitted that there is no hard
data confirming the allegations of discrimination. In this respect,
they have compared the problem to the same difficulty black and
Latino drivers initially faced in providing evidence to support
allegations of racial profiling.35 In 2001, the NMA asked the
American Medical Association (AMA) for its support for a focused
review of current managed care contracts between health plans and
minority physicians. The AMA has yet to act, a fact that is quite
understandable, given the history of contention between the two
groups, and their longstanding and persistent differences in
ideology and perception.36
Recent passage of the Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement and Moderation Act of 200337 (MMA) raises the stakes
considerably. The legislation offers expansive financial and
structural incentives to attract and retain HMOs and PPOs operating
in the Medicare program. Since 1998, MCOs have dropped out of
27. Complaint 21, Thiruchelvam, No. FL-M 6:00-cv-01542.
28. Id. 22.
29. Answer 9-11, Thiruchelvam, No. FL-M 6:00-cv-01542.
30. See Susan Lundine, Minority Docs Dumped by Humana Allege Bias, ORLANDO Bus.
J., Jan. 12, 2001, at A3.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See Shaw, supra note 18.
35. See NewsHour, supra note 15.
36. See infra, Part III.C.
37. Medicare Prescription Drug and Modernization Act, 42 U.S.C.A § 1395 (2003).
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the Medicare market at an alarming rate due to unprofitable
operations. 38 The subsidies contained within the MNA seek to
reverse that trend, giving preferential treatment to HMOs and PPOs
through payment rates that will be 25 percent higher than those
paid to traditional Medicare fee-for-service providers, and
establishing "risk corridors" and a stabilization fund to limit
exposure to market risk.39  To ensure managed care plan
participation in Medicare Advantage, the MNA has increased
aggregate payments by $1.3 billion for 2004 and 2005.40
The planned expansion of profit-driven MCOs into Medicare
has the potential to further increase the marginalization of
physicians of color.41 Traditional fee-for-service Medicare allows
beneficiaries to choose from any physician who accepts Medicare
payments. However, HMOs and PPOs, would restrict access to
physicians by creating a limited network from which enrollees must
select. These limitations could adversely affect physicians of color if
they are not included in the network or are dropped from the
38. Michael Levin-Epstein, Medicare+Choice Reform: Hope, But No Quick Action
Expected, Managed Care, Oct. 2001, available at http//:www.managedcaremag.com/
archives/0110/0110.medicareaction.html (In 1997, Medicare managed care
participation peaked at six million (one in seven beneficiaries)); Lori Achman & Marsha
Gold, Medicare+Choice 1999-2001: An Analysis of Managed Care Plan Withdrawals and
Trends in Benefits and Premiums, Commenwealth Fund, Publication No. 497, 2002,
available at http:www.cmwf.org. (M+C withdrawals affected approximately 2.2 million
Medicare beneficiaries between 1999 and 2002); Lori Achman & Marsha Gold, Trends in
Medicare+Choice Benefits and Premiums, 1999-2002 Commonwealth Fund, Publication No.
580, 2002, available at http://
www.cmwf.org/programs/medfutur/achman-trendsM+C_- 580.pdf (noting that, in
2002, an estimated 536,000 M+C enrollees were affected); Timothy Lake & Randall
Brown, Medicare+Choice Withdrawals: Understanding Key Factors, The Henry J. Kaiser
Family Foundation, Publication No. 6046, 2002, available at
http://www.kff.org/medicare (analyzing the decline in service areas covered by M+C
contracts by percentage of existing M+C contracts and per M+C county); Colleen L.
Barry & Janet Kline, Medicare Managed Care: Medicare+Choice at Five Years, The
Commonwealth Fund, Publication No. 537, 2002, available at
http:www.cmwf.org/programs/medfutur/barryjiveyears-ib-537.pdf (noting that,
since 1999, the number of beneficiaries with an HMO available in their area has
decreased from 72 percent to 64 percent); Timothy D. McBride & Keith J. Mueller,
Inequitable Access: Medicare+Choice Program Fails to Serve Rural America, 7 RURAL POLICY
RES. INST. 1, 1-2 (2002).
39. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395w-132.
40. See Paulette Morgan & Hinda, Chaikind, Cong, Res. Services, Medicare Advantage:
What Does it Mean to Private Plans currently Serving Medicare Beneficiaries, CRS Report
RS21761, at 2-3 (Mar. 8, 2004).
41. See MAYA ROCKEYMOORE & LAURA HAWKINSON, CONGRESSIONAL BLACK
CAUCUS FOUNDATION, INC., STRUCTURED INEFFICIENCY: THE IMPACT OF MEDICARE
REFORM ON AFRICAN AMERICANS (2004), available at
www.cbcfinc.org/pdf/MedicareReform.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2006).
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Medicare health plan.42
B. Studies of Provider Exclusion
Despite the prevalence of managed care throughout the United
States, little is known about its contracting patterns with providers.
Only three studies have examined the issue of exclusion by race and
ethnicity, and the results, while inconclusive, point to the existence
of some differential treatment.
In the first study, done in 1998, the authors report that patient
characteristics, not race or ethnicity, were the primary predictor of
contract terminations. 43 Minority physicians did not experience a
higher rate of denials or terminations than did white physicians.44
Those doctors who care for a disproportionate number of uninsured
and minority patients, however, were less likely to have managed
care patients, an indication that these physicians may be excluded
from full participation in the managed care setting.45 Of the
nonwhite physicians denied a contract, 20 percent believed it was
due to racial discrimination, and 25 percent thought it was related to
not being in the right social circles.46 In the first national study,
Mackenzie reported that while the results do not suggest rampant
discrimination, there are troubling signs of differences in physicians'
experiences based on race. 47  For instance, Asian-American
physicians reported significantly more problems keeping contracts
than white physicians. 48 Also, Latino/a physicians were
42. Id. at 11.
43. See Andrew B. Bindman et al., Selection and Exclusion of Primary Care Physicians by
Managed Care Organizations, 279 JAMA 675 (1998). The researchers chose California for
the study because of the high rate of managed care penetration across the state, and
designed their questionnaire to focus on three main areas: the frequency with which
physicians were denied or terminated from managed care contracts, the characteristics
of the physicians and practices who had this experience, and the impact of the
experience on the physicians' ultimate involvement with managed care. Id. at 676-77.
44. Id. at 678-79.
45. Id. at 679.
46. Id.
47. See Elizabeth R. Mackenzie et al., Experiences of Ethnic Minority Primary Care
Physicians With Managed Care: A National Survey, 5 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 1251 (1999).
The researchers identified four questions germane to the issue of ethnic minority
presence in managed care: 1) experiences with managed care contract acquisition;
2) experiences with managed care contract termination; 3) patient attrition, and
4) perception of the ability to provide appropriate care. A total of 1032 physicians
(67 percent white, 7 percent Latino/a, 8 percent black, 12 percent Asian, 0.4 percent
Native American, 5 percent other) were randomly selected nationwide and asked
detailed questions during a 25-minute telephone interview. Id. at 1252-54.
48. Id. at 1258-59.
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substantially less likely to have managed care patients.49 Race and
ethnicity were not a significant predictor of difficulties in acquiring
or maintaining contracts for other physicians. 50
In 1999, the Maryland State Legislature appropriated funds and
commissioned the Maryland Department of Health and Mental
Hygiene to conduct a statewide study of Maryland physicians about
their managed care experiences.51 Released in September 2001, the
Maryland Study on Physician Experience with Managed Care
("Maryland Study") suggests that the concerns of minority
physicians may be warranted.
Generally, the Maryland Study found that the denial of
applications to join a MCOs' provider network and termination of
contracts by MCOs are not pervasive problems.52 However, when
these actions do occur, minority physicians are the group most
affected. For instance, the Maryland Study found that, as a whole,
minority physicians are more likely than white physicians to
experience denials of membership requests to join a MCOs' provider
network.53 After adjustment for other variables such as practice
type, specialty, board certification, and age, there remained a 15
percent difference between African Americans and whites in terms
of denials, and a 4 percent difference between Asian Americans and
whites.54
Likewise, the Maryland Study found that minority physicians
are more likely to have contracts terminated than whites. The
adjusted difference in contract terminations between African
Americans and whites is 5 percent, and between whites and Asians,
the adjusted difference is 12 percent. 55 Further, more African-
American physicians perceived racial/ethnic discrimination as the
primary reason for differences in contract denials and terminations
than other groups, including Asian-American and Latino/a
respondents. 56
The conclusions of the provider exclusion studies must be
viewed with caution. Generally, the studies suggest that minority
physicians have been relatively successful in obtaining MCO
49. Id. at 1260.
50. Id. at 1258-59.
51. See MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND MENTAL HYGIENE, THE
MARYLAND STUDY ON PHYSICIAN EXPERIENCE WITH MANAGED CARE (2001), available at
http://www.chpdm.org/publications/Physician%20Experience%20with%20Managed
%20Care%20Report%20-%20September%202001.pdf.
52. ld. at 6.
53. Id. at 10.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 12.
56. Id. at 14.
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provider contracts. Yet all MCO contracts are not the same; some are
more lucrative than others. While physicians of color may be able to
obtain contracts for lower paying Medicaid networks they may at
the same time be denied access to employer-funded networks that
MCOs establish to provide health care benefits to employees of large
corporations and institutions. 57 Future research should compare the
types of MCO contracts acquired by different racial/ethnic groups.
II. MCO Selection and De-selection Criteria: Implications
for Minority Health
Managed care emerged the victor in the health finance reform
battles of the early 1990s, and market-driven health care was widely
viewed as the best alternative to the unbridled fee-for-service
system.58 Under a fee-for-service regime, doctors receive
compensation for every office visit and for every procedure, which
creates a substantial financial incentive for physicians to increase the
provision of health services. 59 The market approach to health care
finance and delivery committed complex problems of access, cost,
quality, and equity to the business plans of commercial MCOs.60
Market solutions, however, often comparatively disadvantage
disfavored groups. On this point, Cass Sunstein asserts that, "study
after study has shown that the market often devalues the products
and enterprises of both blacks and women." 61 The market often
devalues the preferences of minority consumers as well. 62
This section of the article examines several ways in which
profit-driven MCOs potentially mismeasure the efficiency and
quality of minority physicians, and devalue the preferences of
minority health care consumers. The starting point is an analysis of
57. See Jeremy Manier, PUSH Charges Bias by Key HMO: United Healthcare Paying Less
to South Side Doctors, Group Contends, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 1, 1998, at N3.
58. See, e.g., Karen Davis & Cathy Schoen, Universal Coverage: Building on Medicare
and Employer Financing, 13 HEALTH AFF. 7 (1994); Mark V. Pauly, Making a Case for
Employer-Enforced Individual Mandates, 13 HEALTH AFF. (1994); Paul Starr & Walter A.
Zelman, A Bridge to Compromise: Competition Under a Budget, 12 HEALTH AFF. 7 (1993);
Alain C. Enthoven & Richard Kronick, Universal Health Insurance Through Incentives
Reform, 265 JAMA 2532 (1991); John Holahan et al., An American Approach to Health
System Reform, 265 JAMA 2537 (1991).
59. See Alain C. Enthoven, The History and Principles of Managed Competition, 12
HEALTH AFF. 24, 25 (1993) (characterizing the traditional fee-for-service system as a
guild).
60. See Jacobi, supra note 14, at 397.
61. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY MARKETS DON'T STOP DIScRIMINATION 7 (1997).
62. Id.
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race-neutral criteria that MCOs use to select and de-select
physicians. This article suggests that these criteria are flawed and
disproportionately subject minority physicians to inequitable
decisions and actions. Next, this section turns to minority
consumers and demonstrates that the exclusion of minority
physicians from provider networks potentially widens health care
disparities. Moreover, the exclusion of minority providers restricts
the ability of minority consumers to satisfy their preference of
having a physician of like racial and ethnic backgrounds, which
leads to poorer patient satisfaction and outcomes.
A. Economic Profiling
Economic profiles are statistical pictures of physician costs and
resource utilization expressed as rates and compared with other
physicians and MCO guidelines. 63 MCOs often reward physicians
with low economic profiles by placing them in more lucrative
networks or increasing their compensation. 64 Physicians with high
economic profiles are frequently denied admission to provider
networks or terminated because MCOs consider these providers as
costly and inefficient.65 Though race neutral, the incidence of
economic profiling falls primarily on minority providers and their
patients. Minority physicians are more likely to serve minority
populations. 66 Nearly 40 percent of all minority medical school
graduates practice medicine in underserved areas, compared to 10
percent of their white colleagues. 67 Communities with high
proportions of black and Latino/a residents are four times as likely
as others to have a shortage of physicians, regardless of community
income. 68 In these communities, black physicians provide 52 percent
of the care for black patients, and Latino/a physicians provide 54
percent of the care for Latino patients. 69
Physicians of color frequently have higher economic profiling
63. See John Blum, The Evolution of Physician Credentialing into Managed Care Selective
Contracting, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 173, 180 (1996); Jerome P. Kassirer, The Use and Abuse of
Practice Profiles, 330 NEw ENG. J. MED. 634, 634 (1994) (describing the advent and
manipulation of practice profiles).
64. See Linda Peeno, The Second Coming of Managed Care, 40 TRIAL 18, 26 (2004).
65. See NORBERT GOLDFIELD, PHYSICIAN PROFILING AND RISK ADJUSTMENT 8 (1999).
66. See Council Graduate Medical Education, Twelfth Report: Minorities in Medicine,
May 1998, available at http:/www.cogme.gov/12.pdf.
67. Id.
68. See Miriam Komaromy et al., The Role of Black and Hispanic Physicians in Providing
Care for Underserved Populations, 344 JAMA 1305 (1996).
69. Id. at 1309.
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numbers because many of their patients need more services than the
statistical norm.70 Because of the lack of prior health care, racial and
ethnic minorities and the underserved typically enter MCOs with a
backlog of illnesses that have been inadequately treated or have
gone untreated. 71 Because the illnesses are more severe, they require
more intense treatment over a longer period, so that treatment falls
outside of the normal course. 72 Even for illnesses developed after
enrollment in an MCO, the course of the illness is likely to be longer
and more severe.7 3
Logically, an adjustment should be made to economic profiling
data to reflect differences in case-mix, given the objective of
obtaining an accurate assessment of physician efficiency and cost-
effectiveness. 74  Few MCOs, however, perform such an
adjustment. 75 As one might expect, the current practice of not
adjusting leads MCOs to overestimate physicians' variance from the
statistical norm. For instance, Harvard researchers found that three-
quarters of physicians identified as inefficient or high deficit
providers fell within the statistically accepted range after
adjustments were made to their economic profiles. 76 The NMA has
urged MCOs not to go strictly by the numbers when selecting and
de-selecting physicians, and has identified new software packages
that risk-adjust the data.77 The industry has not acted.
As a result, the current economic profiling practices understate
the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of many minority physicians.
Conversely, these practices may privilege many majority group
70. See Robert M. Mayberry et al., Racial and Ethnic Differences in Access to Medical
Care, 57 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 108 (2000).
71. See, e.g., David R. Williams and Chiquita Collins, U.S. Socioeconomic and Racial
Differences in Health: Patterns and Explanations, 21 ANN. REV. SOC. 349, 367-68 (1995)
72. See Sidney D. Watson, Health Care in the Inner City: Asking the Right Question, 71
N.C. L. REV. 1647, 1647-54 (1993);
73, Id.
74. See Mark V. Pauly, The Public Policy Implications of Using Outcome Statistics, 58
BROOK. L. REV. 35, 37 (1992); DAVID W. EMMONS & GREGORY D. WOZNIAK, PHYSICIAN
PROFILING IN SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF MEDICAL PRACTICE 9 (Martin L.
Gonzalez ed., 1993).
75. See Huw Davies & Andrew Bindman, Healthcare Report Cards: Implication for
Vulnerable Patient Populations and the Organizations Providing them Care, 27 J. HEALTH
POL'Y & L. 379, 387 (2002) (finding that some MCOs adjust for patient age and sex only,
while the vast majority ignore case mix adjustment altogether). Failing to adjust
introduces into the MCO physician efficiency evaluation process the potential for bias
based on race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status. Id.
76. See S. Salem-Schatz et al., The Case for Case-Mix Adjustment in Practice Profiling:
When Good Apples Look Bad, 272 JAMA 871 (1994). See also Timothy Hofer et al., The
Unreliability of Individual Physician 'Report Cards'for Assessing the Costs and Quality of Care
of a Chronic Disease, 281 JAMA 2098 (1999).
77. See Shaw, supra note 18.
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physicians, especially those who serve healthier and more affluent
patients. Further, they perversely penalize some minority patients
by substantially limiting their ability to choose a provider of the
same racial/ethnic background.
B. Medical Group Membership
MCOs prefer to contract with large medical groups because it
lowers negotiating costs, and also because medical groups are more
likely to engage in internal peer review. 78 Physicians of any race in
solo practice have a harder time getting into managed care plans.79
Minority physicians are disproportionately affected by the medical
group membership requirement, however, because a higher
percentage are solo practitioners. For instance, 75 percent of self-
employed black physicians work in solo office-based practices.8 0
Even though medical group membership is practically a
prerequisite to obtaining an MCO contract, physicians of color face
substantial barriers to entering such groups. Often, they are unable
to buy their way into medical groups that both have startup costs
and ask all physicians to share in those costs.8' Because these
physicians disproportionately serve a poorer and usually sicker
clientele, they are not as well compensated as white doctors.
Medicaid payments account for 24.6 percent of black physician
revenues, yet Medicaid, on average, pays only 47 percent of what
private insurers pay.8 2 In some cases, medical groups are formed by
buying the practices of individual physicians. 83 Because minority
physicians serve poorer and sicker patients, and provide more
charity care, the cost of maintaining their practices is higher and the
revenues lower, which likely deters medical groups from making
offers to buy such practices.84
78. See Mark A. Hall, Managed Competition and Integrated Health Care Delivery Systems,
29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1994).
79. See Mackenzie, supra note 47 at 1255 (using survey shows that physicians in solo
practice, as compared to physicians in group practice, report significantly more
problems securing contracts and report more severe problems with not being able to
secure enough contracts).
80. See Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, Can Black Doctors Survive?
Managed Care, Cuts in Training, and Attacks on Affirmative Action Threaten to Reduce the
Ranks of Black Physicians, available at
http://www.jointcenter.org/publicationsl/focus/FocusDetail.php?recordlD=44.
81. See Starr, supra note 18.
82. See Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, supra note 80; Sidney Watson,
Commercialization of Medicaid, 45 ST. LOUIS. U. L.J. 53, 56 (2001).
83. See Starr, supra note 18.
84. See Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, supra note 80.
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More frequently, however, many physicians of color choose to
practice solo. Some fear that practicing in a group will cut them off
from their patients because there is no obligation to accept Medicaid
and many large medical groups refuse to accept Medicaid patients
because of financial and "other" reasons.8 5  Other minority
physicians point to the lingering suspicion that majority-dominated
medical groups will subordinate physicians of color, limiting their
role in management decisions and policy-making. 86 Some indicate
that despite ethical obligations of equality, medical groups are often
hostile to the inclusion of minority physicians.
Speaking before the North Carolina Legislative Black Caucus in
June 2002, Dr. Ron Virmani described the continuing existence of
the "good old boy" network in medicine:
The big white medical groups import newly graduated white
residents from far-flung cities and ignore those of us seeking
association and opportunity. When this pattern of exclusion
becomes too obvious, they take in a token number of African
Americans and other politically active minorities. This move is
calculated to douse any fire of criticism that may be gaining in
intensity. 87
While MCOs may have very good reasons for preferring
providers affiliated with medical groups, this selection criterion
implicitly devalues the quality of care provided by minority solo
practitioners. This practice is also insensitive to both the historical
and contemporary role of race and ethnicity in determining medical
group composition.
C. Board Certification
A final hurdle is the nearly universal requirement that
participating physicians be board-certified, that is, that they have
passed an examination by a medical specialty board.88 Board
certification is not a requirement for practicing medicine in this
85. See Sara Rosenbaum et al., U.S. Civil Rights Policy and Access to Heath Care by
Minority Americans: Implications for a Changing Health Care System, 57 MED. CARE RES. &
REV. 236, Suppl. 1, (2000).
86. See Starr, supra note 18.
87. Ron A. Virmani, Discrimination in U.S. Medicine, presented at the 17th Annual
Legislative, Educational and Weekend Conference sponsored by the North Carolina
Legislative Black Caucus Foundation, Inc., (June 22, 2003) (copy on file with author).
88. See Troyan Brennan et al., The Role of Physician Specialty Board Certification Status
in the Quality Movement, 292 JAMA 1038 (2004).
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country, and some MCOs use board certification mainly as a
marketing tool.8 9
Board certification rates differ along racial lines. An estimated
79 percent of white physicians are board-certified compared to 68
percent of black physicians. 90 One reason for the disparity is that
most black physicians are primary care physicians. 91  Board
certification for primary care physicians is a relatively new
phenomenon and minority physicians have been reluctant to
undergo the extra years of training and additional costs. 92
Serving minorities and the poor is not a skill that can be
measured through a written exam. It requires a special
understanding of the environment and culture as well as special
communication skills and sensitivities that come from being
accepted in that environment. Most of the minority physicians
practicing in these communities are board qualified, and according
to some, there is little to gain from taking the examinations except
an additional certificate that their patients care little about. 93
D. Minority Health
Flawed assessments of physician quality and efficiency have
serious implications for minority health. MCOs may overlook
talented minority physicians who know the community and
understand their symptoms and needs.
Statistical trends show a persistent, distressing disparity in key
health indicators among minority populations relative to the overall
population.94  For instance, the African-American community
carries a greater burden of illness, particularly diabetes, cancer,
heart disease, infant mortality, and HIV/AIDS, than does the
majority white population. 95 In addition, a growing body of
89. See Jay Greene, Certification Woes: No Boards, No Income, Pinnacle Health Group
News, July 31, 2000 (reporting that the industry acknowledges that some MCOs require
board certification as a marketing tool), available at http://www.phg.com/article
a005.htm.
90. See NewsHour, supra note 15.
91. See AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 4, at 41.
92. All Things Considered: Minority Doctors Say They Can't Get Into HMOs (National
Public Radio Broadcast, Nov. 14, 1996) (transcript at 4).
93. Interview with Kimkiya Asika, Old North State Medical Association, (August 5,
2004).
94. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Health Disparities Experienced by
Black or African Americans - United States, 54 Mortality Morbidity Weekly Rev. 1-3 (Jan.
14, 2005), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mnwr/preview/mmwrhtml/
mm5401a1.htm.
95. Id.
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compelling evidence points to differential medical treatment for
similarly situated minority and white patients. 96 Black patients are
less likely to receive cardiovascular care, cancer screening, HIV
therapy, and a host of other medical and surgical procedures, even
after adjustments are made for clinical condition, insurance,
education, and income. 97
Patients of color commonly prefer health care from clinicians of
the same racial and ethnic background, 98 and report greater
satisfaction, trust, and better physician relationships when the
health care system satisfies this preference. Some studies show that
they also have better outcomes. In 1999, two studies examined how
race affects the medical visit. In a JAMA study published that year,
researchers at the Johns Hopkins School of Public Health reported
that patients in same-race relationships rated their physicians'
decision-making styles as significantly more participatory than
patients in race-disconcordant relationships. 99 Minority patients
had significantly less partnership building relationships with white
physicians regardless of patient education level. This finding
suggests that racial and ethnic differences, rather than
socioeconomic differences, serve as more important communication
96. In 1999 Congress instructed the Institute of Medicine to prepare a report on racial
disparities in health care. The study committee performed a literature review of articles
in the PUBMED and MEDLINE databases published in peer-reviewed journals from
1992 to 2002. To be selected, the articles must have addressed racial differences in health
care while controlling for access and a range of other potential confounding variables.
Over one hundred studies were selected and summarized. See Institute of Medicine,
UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE
30 (Brian D. Smedley et al., eds., 2003). See also Rene Bowser, Racial Profiling in Health
Care: An Institutional Analysis of Medical Treatment Disparities, 7 MICH. J. RACE & L. 80, 83-
89 (2001); M. Gregg Bloche, Race and Discretion in American Medicine, 1 YALE J. HEALTH
POL'Y L. & ETHICS 95 (2001); Gwendolyn Roberts Majette, Access to Health Care: What a
Difference Shades of Color Make, 12 ANNALS HEALTH L. 121 (2003); Barbara A. Noah, Racial
Disparities in the Delivery of Health Care, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 135 (1998); Sidney D.
Watson, Race, Ethnicity and Quality of Care: Inequalities and Incentives, 27 AM. J.L. & MED.
203 (2001); Sidney D. Watson, Race, Ethnicity and Hospital Care: The Need for Racial and
Ethnic Data, 30 J. HEALTH & HOSP. L. 125 (1997).
97. See Institute of Medicine, supra note 96, at 25-61.
98. For instance, On April 5, 2005, a Harlem-based physician launched a new
website devoted to matching African Americans with black physicians. The free internet
service allows the public to locate U.S.-based African-American physicians, as well as
dentists, podiatrists, clinical psychologists, and other health care providers. According to
its founder, the idea for the service grew out of the strong demand expressed by African
Americans to locate and be treated by physicians of the same race. See Find a Black
Doctor, http://www.findablackdoctor.com.
99. Lisa Cooper-Patrick et al., Race, Gender, and Partnership in the Patient-Physician
Relationship, 282 JAMA 583 (1999). For example, compared to white patients, black
patients visiting white physicians were significantly less likely to rate their visits as
participatory. Id at 587.
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barriers between patients and physicians.100
Also in 1999, another study reported that black patients paired
with black physicians were much more likely than those paired with
white physicians to rate their physicians as excellent overall,
excellent at treating them with respect, explaining problems,
listening, and being accessible to them.'01 In addition, black patients
paired with black physicians reported receiving more preventive
care and other necessary medical care.102 Latino/a patients paired
with Latino/a physicians likewise reported greater satisfaction. 103
In 2001, Oliver and colleagues reported that white physicians, on
average, spend less time with African-American patients than with
white patients on planning treatment decisions, providing health
education, chatting, assessing patients' health knowledge, and
answering questions.104
In 2004, researchers listened in on examining rooms for clues as
to why minorities tend to receive lower quality health care than
whites, even when they have equal access and ability to pay.105
They found that physicians tend to do more of the talking during
examinations when patients are black; indeed physicians talked 43
percent more than their black patients compared to 24 percent more
than their white ones. 106 The emotional tenor of conversations, on
the part of both patients and physicians, was more likely to be
positive when patients were white.10 7 Black patients and their
doctors sounded less interested, engaged, and friendly, compared
with conversations between white patients and their physicians. 108
Professor Dorothy Roberts suggests that the experience of both
racism and sexism profoundly affects the medical visit for women of
color. 10 9 She explains that the political dimension of doctor-patient
communications is more apparent when the patient is a woman of
color and suggests that women of color may be more willing to
resist medical supervision because they are more suspicious of
100. Id. at 588.
101. See Somnath Saha et. al., Patient-Physician Racial Concordance and the Perceived
Quality and Use of Health Care, 159 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 997, 997-98 (1999).
102. Id. at 1002.
103. Id. at 1000.
104. Milton Oliver et al., Time Use in Clinical Encounters: Are African-American Patients
Treated Differently?, 93 J. NATL. MED ASSN. 380 (2001).
105. Id.
106. See Rachel Johnson et al., Patient Race/Ethnicity and the Quality of Patient-Physician
Communication During Medical Visits, 94 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 2084 (2004).
107. Id. at 2085-86.
108. Id.
109. See Dorothy E. Roberts, RECONSTRUCTING THE PATIENT: STARTING WITH WOMEN
OF COLOR, IN FEMINISM AND BIOETHIcS 116,117 (Susan M. Wolf ed., 1996).
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doctors' claims of beneficence.1 0
Research indicates that patient outcomes improve when
provider and patient are of the same racial and ethnic background.
When patients and providers speak the same native language,
patients are more likely to report positive physical and mental
health outcomes.111 Conversely, patients' inability to communicate
in their native language leads to delays in care, fewer or missed
appointments, and non-adherence to treatment. 112 Medical error
frequently occurs when physicians can't understand the health
complaints of patients with limited English proficiency. 113 Language
aside, there is limited empirical evidence that race concordance
directly improves patient outcomes because studies have not been
done in this area.114  Generally, positive physician-patient
communication and participatory decision-making (both associated
with race concordance), have been linked to better outcomes. With
this in mind, there are good reasons to believe that race concordance
is also associated with improved outcomes.
Increasing the supply of minority physicians is critical to
improving healthcare in minority communities. Minority
physicians' understanding of the cultural, social, and economic
issues present in minority communities is essential to providing
appropriate, high-quality services to this population. Another
reason the health status of blacks, Latinos/as and Asian-Americans
is so dependent on the availability of minority physicians is that
these doctors are much more likely than their white colleagues to
locate their practices in areas with large minority populations, areas
that are usually medically underserved as well. Selection and de-
selection practices that reduce the number of physicians available to
minority groups will increase the likelihood that minorities will
continue to have less access to health care than others and continue
to have poorer health.
110. Id. Professor Roberts also points out that women of color are more willing to
reject their doctor's orders, as well as the dominant medical language.
111. See Eliseo J. Perez-Stable et al., The Effects of Ethnicity and Language on Medical
Outcomes of Patients with Hypertension or Diabetes, 35 MED. CARE 1212, 1213 (1997).
112. See, e.g., Kathryn Pitkin Derose & David W. Baker, Limited English Proficiency and
Latinos' Use of Physician Services, 57 MED. CARE RESEARCH REV. 76 (2000); Aaron Manson,
Language Concordance as a Determinate of Patient Compliance and Emergency Room Use in
Patients with Asthma, 26 MED. CARE 1119 (1988); Sherry Riddick, Improving Access for
Limited English Speaking Consumers: A Review of Strategies in Health Care Settings, 9 J.
HEALTH CARE POOR & UNDERSERVED 40 (1998).
113. See Perez-Stable, supra note 111, at 1213.
114. See Robert Rosenheck et al., Effect of Clinician-Veteran Racial Pairing in the
Treatment of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 152 AM. J. PSYCH. 555 (1995).
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III. The Medical Professions' Third World: Discrimination
and Physicians of Color
The early periods of the U.S. health care system set a tone,
which resonates today, that America's health care professions were
to be dominated by a white elite. Black health care professionals -
including physicians, dentists and nurses - were banned from the
nation's professional health schools.115  The Plessy v. Ferguson
decision and the subsequent wave of Jim Crow legislation confined
the opportunities available to black physicians - restricting the
supply, limiting the ability to serve minority communities, and
excluding black physicians from powerful professional
organizations that shaped health care policy.1 16
Historical patterns of segregation both within the medical
profession and society shaped physician practice patterns and
continue to influence where physicians practice, how they organize
their practices, and what patients they see. The continuity of the
"good old boy" network may play a role in determining which
physicians are recruited and selected. According to Bindman,
"[m]anaged care networks may develop around existing informal
physician networks based on traditional referral patterns and social
arrangements and may perpetuate segregated arrangements." 117
Elizabeth Mackinzie also stresses the important role of informal
networks in acquiring contracts and their marginalizing effect on
minority physicians. 118
A. Barriers to Medical Education and Training
Because of the color line, the first few black physicians received
their medical degrees abroad.11 9 In 1849, Oliver Wendell Holmes Sr.
115. See, e.g., W. Michael Byrd & Linda A Clayton, AN AMERICAN HEALTH DILEMMA:
RACE, MEDICINE AND HEALTH CARE IN THE UNITED STATES 1900-2000 (Routledge 2002).
116. See DAVID BARTON SMITH, HEALTH CARE DWIDED: RACE AND HEALING A NATION
14 (University of Michigan Press 1999). Blacks developed a separate medical education
system. Under AMA pressure, access to the medical profession increasingly required a
college degree followed by medical school; both avenues were less available to blacks.
Black colleges were the natural response, including the two leading black medical
schools, Howard in Washington and Meharry in Nashville. See W. Montague Cobb,
Surgery and the Negro Physician: Some Parallels in Background, 43 J. NAT'L MED. ASS'N 145,
150-51 (1951).
117. See Andrew Bindman et al., Selection and Exclusion of Primary Care Physicians by
Managed Care Organizations, 279 JAMA 675, 675 (1998).
118. See Mackenzie, supra note 47, at 1261.
119. JAMES L. CURTIS, BLACKS, MEDICAL SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETY (University of
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admitted three blacks to the Harvard Medical School. 120  In
response, the students passed and forwarded to the medical faculty
resolutions opposing the admissions because they believed the
presence of blacks would cheapen the Harvard medical degree,
diminish the quality of education and would be socially offensive.121
Professor Holmes acquiesced to student demands and dismissed the
admitted students. 122 In 1860, only nine northern medical schools
admitted blacks; southern medical schools were completely closed.
In 1905, there were 1,465 black physicians; only 14.5 were graduates
of white institutions. 123 By 1950, blacks were 10 percent of the
population, but only 2.2 percent of all physicians, 124 and only 133
blacks graduated from medical school, mostly from the two black
institutions - Meharry (Nashville) and Howard (Washington,
D.C.). 125
More than a decade after the 1954 Brown decision, neither the
medical profession nor the medical education system had
responded enthusiastically to the demand for racial integration.
Overt discrimination against black medical students persisted well
into the 1960s; the first southern medical school to admit blacks was
the University of Arkansas in 1948.126 It was not until 1967 that the
last southern medical school admitted a black medical student.127 In
1971, the first year for which there are data on minority groups
other than blacks, only 19 Mexican Americans, 14 mainland Puerto
Michigan Press 1971).
120. See Harry M. Delany, Affirmative Action and Diversity in the Medical Profession, 20
EINSTEIN J. BIOLOGICAL MED. 78, 79 (2004).
121. Id. at 78-79.
122. Id. at 78. Blacks faced discrimination in gaining acceptance to law and other
professional schools, but the exclusion of blacks from white medical schools was
singular because it implicated social taboos and customs prohibiting interracial
touching. For instance, Audre de Lambart Maynard, a prominent New York physician
most noted for saving Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.'s life after a near fatal stabbing in 1958,
applied to and was accepted by the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Columbia
University in 1922. After enrolling, the dean informed Maynard that after his first two
years at Columbia it would be best for him to transfer to Howard for his clinical years
because of the "embarrassment" likely to arise if he carried out certain examinations on
white patients.
123. See HERBERT M. MORAIS, THE HISTORY OF THE NEGRO IN MEDICINE 60 (New York
Publishers Co. 1970).
124. See DIETRICH C. RE1TZES, NEGROES AND MEDICINE xxvii (Harvard University
Press 1958).
125. A JBHE Check-Up on Blacks in U.S. Medical Schools, J. OF BLACKS IN HIGHER EDUC.,
July 18, 2005, available at http://www.jbhe.com/features/47_medicalschools.html.
126. See Paul Comely, Segregation and Discrimination in Medical Care in the United
States, 46 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1074 (1956).
127. EDWARD H. BEARDSLEY, A HISTORY OF NEGLECT: HEALTH CARE FOR BLACKS AND
MILL WORKERS IN THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY SOUTH 255 (University of Tennessee Press
1987).
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Ricans, and 2 Native Americans graduated from U.S. medical
schools. 128
Blacks faced similar exclusion from most medical internship
and residency programs, prerequisites for obtaining a medical
license to practice, regardless of their medical school
achievements.1 29 Blacks wanting to obtain postgraduate training
were expected to pursue it at one of the black hospitals; however,
not all black hospitals welcomed them.130 Indeed, white-sponsored
hospitals that served black patients were often hostile to the
advancement of black physicians. 131
B. AMA Exclusion
Paul Starr chronicled the rise of medicine as a profession from
the 1850s, and the growing power of the American Medical
Association (AMA),132 but black physicians were largely excluded
from the AMA and its constituent societies. 133 This professional
discrimination had disastrous consequences for African-American
patients, who had only black physicians to work for their interests in
the health care system. 34
Historically, the AMA ignored the equality demands of black
physicians, overtly discriminated against them, and refused their
128. Herbert Nickens et al., Project 3000 by 2000: Racial and Ethnic Diversity in U.S.
Medical Schools, 331 NEw ENGL. J. MED. 472, 472-73 (2004).
129. PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE
(Greenwood 1982).
130. See VANESSA N. GAMBLE, MAKING A PLACE FOR OURSELVES: THE BLACK
HOSPITAL MOVEMENT, 1920-1945 31 (Oxford University Press 1995).
131. Id. at 31-32. When segregated hospitals were available to blacks, they were often
used for training white physicians, residents and interns. See H.M. Green, Hospitals and
Public Health Facilities for Negroes, 1928 PROC. OF THE NATL CONF. OF SOC. WORK 179,
179-80 (1928) ("Many cities, especially in the South, provide wards, usually in the
basement of their city hospitals, for Negro patients. A few northern cities admit Negro
patients to their free wards along with their white paupers. These institutions invariably
exclude Negro physicians. Here the Negro patients (North and South) are used largely
as clinical material for training internes [sic] of another race, a practice employed by no
other civilized country in the world.").
132. STARR, supra note 129.
133. Although black physicians appreciated the virtues of professionalism in
medicine, the color line prevented them from obtaining what other groups gained from
professionalism: the institutionalization and advancement of a specialized body of
knowledge; the development of educational institutions to further this knowledge; the
development and enforcement of a professional code of ethics; as well as the solidarity,
security and fellowship valued by all members of any profession. See Byrd & Clayton,
supra note 115.
134. Id.
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efforts of professional participation at all levels. Black physicians
created the National Medical Association NMA in 1895 only after
they had waged a long and unsuccessful effort to integrate the
AMA.135 From the beginning, the NMA and the AMA were often
completely opposed in philosophy and ideology regarding health
needs, health care services, health policy and the health rights of
disadvantaged populations. 136
C. Hospital Admitting Privileges
State and local medical associations prevented vitally needed
access to hospitals, excluding minority physicians from hospital
appointments and hospital admitting privileges.137 The medical-
staff bylaws of most hospitals in the United States required that
physicians applying for hospital admitting privileges be a member
in good standing of the local county medical society.138 At the same
time, the bylaws of most state medical societies explicitly restricted
membership to white physicians.139  Because county medical
societies were constituent members of the state body, the race
restriction applied at the local level.140 This system of racial
subordination forced physicians of color to turn over care of their
hospitalized patients to white physicians; those fortunate enough to
gain admitting privileges were frequently forced to work under the
supervision of white physicians. 141
These racially discriminatory practices badly undermined
confidence in black physicians and contributed to a perception that
135. Id. Black physicians also created local medical societies such as the Tennessee
Colored Medical Association (1880): the Medico-Chirurgical Society of the District of
Columbia (1884); the Lone Star State Medical Association (1886); the Old North State
Medical Society of North Carolina (1887), the Association of Physicians, Dentists, and
Pharmacists in Georgia (1893); the Association of Physicians, Dentists, and Pharmacists
in Georgia (1893); and the Alabama Medical, Dental and Pharmaceutical Association
(1896).
136. In medical education, for example, the AMA saw a clear place for black
physicians. Their education should be focused on the principles of hygiene, rather the
techniques of surgery, and their usefulness as physicians should be focused on
preventing the spread of tuberculosis and other infectious diseases from black
populations to white populations. See ABRAHAM FLEXNER, MEDICAL EDUCATION IN THE
UNITED STATES AND CANADA (Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching
1910).
137. See Comely, supra note 126, at 1077-78 (discussing role of AMA and its
constituent societies in denying hospital admitting privileges to black physicians).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See GAMBLE, supra note 130, at 12.
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they were less competent than their white peers. 142 The devaluing
of black physicians has proven strongly resistant to change. For
instance, in a little-noted remark to the New York Times in 1997,
Ward Connerly, the leader in the fight against California's racial
bookkeeping and preferences, quipped: "If you're lying on a
gurney, and a black doctor shows up, you're going to get up and
crawl out." 14 3
In 1938, the NMA, struggling to obtain hospital admitting
privileges for its members approached the AMA with three
requests: (1) recognize NMA membership as sufficient qualification
for AMA membership, thereby circumventing the white-only
medical societies; (2) eliminate the racial identification of black
physicians who were AMA members in the AMA directory (black
members were identified with "Col." appearing after their names);
(3) support the admission of black physicians to staff privileges at
tax-supported hospitals. The AMA agreed to the second request
only, and dropped all racial designation from the AMA directory in
1940.144
Overt discrimination against black physicians in the south
persisted well into the 1960s, with the AMA issuing non-binding
proclamations of non-discrimination, but refusing to challenge
discriminatory practices by its local and state constituent medical
societies. 45 In 1966, the AMA House of Delegates again defeated a
resolution that would have expelled from the AMA constituent
societies that engaged in discriminatory practices. 146
D. Government Sanctioned Discrimination
The federal government placed its imprimatur on physician
discrimination under the Hill-Burton Act of 1946.147 Segregationist
142. Id.
143. See Barry Bearak, Between Black and White - A Special Report: Questions of Race Run
Deep for Foe of Preferences, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1997, § 1, at 3.
144. See SMITH, supra note 116.
145. The AMA passed weak resolutions in 1950 and 1952, but did nothing to prevent
its local and state medical societies from excluding blacks from membership, with full
knowledge that such membership was necessary to be appointed to the medical staffs of
most hospitals. See MORALS, supra note 123, at 152-53, 175, 224. For instance, a 1950
resolution urged that "constituent and component societies that have restrictive
membership provisions based on race study this question in light of prevailing
conditions, with the view to taking steps as they may elect to eliminate such restrictive
provisions." AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, Resolution on Restrictive Membership
Provisions, 143 JAMA 1086 (1950).
146. See SMITH, supra note 116, at 73-74.
147. Hospital Survey and Construction Act, Pub. L. No. 79-725, 60 Stat. 1040 (1946).
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Senator Lester Hill carefully designed the statute to permit
"separate but equal" facilities. 148  Of 7000 Hill-Burton projects
funded before 1970, only 104 were racially inclusive, including 84
white facilities and 20 black facilities. 149 The National Medical
Association opposed the Hill-Burton "separate but equal"
provisions. 150
Black physicians sought relief from the federal courts. Simkins v.
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 51 involved the Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hospital and the Wesley Long Community Hospital of
Greensboro, North Carolina, which had received substantial federal
funds under Hill-Burton.152 Both hospitals had formal policies that
denied staff privileges to black physicians and dentists.153
The court of appeals held that the refusal to grant staff
privileges to black doctors discriminated against them in violation
of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
finding that the hospitals' receipt of federal construction money
constituted state action.154 The Simkins court also held that the Hill-
Burton "separate but equal" provisions were unconstitutional. 55
Congress passed Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 156 in part,
to ensure that federal money could no longer be used to support
discrimination in health care. The AMA and NMA differed sharply
on the implementation of Title VI in health care. The NMA wanted
a close watch of all health facilities and supported the collection of
provider and patient race information. 157 The AMA opposed the
collection of data on the race of hospital staff physician members,
For a legislative history of Hill-Burton, see Congressional Quarterly, Inc., Hill-Burton
Hospital Survey and Construction Act, 1946, in CONGRESS AND THE NATION 1945-1964
1122-23 (1965). Under the Hill-Burton program, federal and state governments assisted
in the planning and construction of thousands of hospitals and other health facilities
across the United States, most of which continued their existing patterns of
discrimination and segregation untroubled by the receipt of federal funds. See Morais,
supra note 123, at 152.
148. See SMITH, supra note 116, at 46-47.
149. See MORAIS, supra note 123, at 181.
150. Id. at 152.
151. 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963) (en banc), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964).
152. Id. at 960.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 967-68.
155. In Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1964), plaintiffs alleged that the James
Walker Memorial Hospital in Wilmington, North Carolina, denied staff privileges to
black physicians. The court of appeals found that sufficient "state action" was present to
make the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment applicable, and reversed the district
court's dismissal of the complaint.
156. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § § 2000d-2000d-4 (1982)).
157. See MORALS, supra note 123, at 197.
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labeling this method of enforcement a "race quota system." 158
In 1965, President Lyndon Johnson connected Medicare
funding with Title VI compliance. 159 In doing so, President Johnson
risked a boycott of the fledgling health care program. The lure of
federal funds, together with Johnson's political skills, ultimately
convinced physicians and hospitals to participate in Medicare,
although physicians were exempted from the proscriptions of Title
VI.160 The NMA supported the linkage of Medicare and Title VI,161
while the AMA opposed Medicare altogether and undertook a
massive campaign to portray Medicare as "socialized medicine."1 62
Even though de jure discrimination was over, it quickly became
evident that old habits die hard. To keep minority physicians out,
hospitals employed a variety of tactics such as secrecy and abuse of
due process. Cypress v. Newport News General and Nonsectarian
Hospital Ass'n,163 involved discrimination at the Riverside Hospital
in Newport News, Virginia. The plaintiff was a board-certified
pediatrician who had met all the requirements of the American
Board of Pediatrics for certification in that specialty. 64 Dr. Cypress
had applied for staff privileges on two separate occasions, and been
rejected twice. 165  There were only seven pediatricians in the
community - six of them were white, and all of the white
pediatricians had been given staff privileges. 166
Another black physician, Dr. C. Waldo Scott, was a board-
certified surgeon. He, too, applied for staff privileges and was
denied. 167 There were 18 white surgeons in the community, only
half of them board certified. Seventeen of them had been given staff
privileges by the hospital. 168 Medical experts in the fields of Dr.
Cypress' and Dr. Scott's specialties testified that their professional
qualifications and skills were outstanding. 169 The Court of Appeals
158. Id. at 197.
159. See SMITH, supra note 116.
160. See Sidney D. Watson, Race, Ethnicity and Quality of Care: Inequalities and
Incentives, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 203, 214 (2001).
161. Hearings on H.R. 6675 Before the S. Fin. Comm., 89th Cong. 323-28 (1965)
(statement of Dr. W. Montague Cobb, President of the National Medical Association).
162. See STARR, supra note 129, at 368.
163. 375 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1967).
164. Id. at 651.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 652.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. One expert was a Professor Emeritus at Harvard Medical School, former Chief of
Children's Services at Massachusetts General Hospital, and past President of the
American Pediatric Association. He not only reviewed the paper credentials of Dr.
Cypress, but also directly observed him while Dr. Cypress was treating patients. He
testified that he would be glad to recommend Dr. Cypress for appointment to the
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granted injunctive relief under Title VI.170
Racial discrimination and differential treatment within the
medical profession reemerged as a major problem in the 1980s.
Allegations that white-run hospitals were purging black physicians
from hospital staffs surfaced in Detroit, Chicago, Forth Worth, and
Houston, among other places. 171 The charge was that under the
guise of "quality assurance" professional peer review was being
used in a racially discriminatory manner to drive out physicians of
color.172 In 1986, Dr. W. Michael Byrd, a leading figure in the fight
for medical civil rights, urged Congress not to enact legislation that
would immunize members of peer review committees from civil
actions:
In reference to black doctors, there is presently a purge taking
place in the profession. The hospital staff disciplinary process is
one of the major mechanisms of carrying this out. This new wave
of discrimination taking place in the nation's hospitals is easy to
document. The National Medical Association, the National
NAACP, and the Office of Civil Rights consider the problem "an
epidemic." To arm white organized medicine and the medical-
industrial complex with more tools to discriminate is analogous to
giving Jack the Ripper a new machete or even a machine gun.
This certainly would enhance their "kill power." How did this
state of affairs evolve in our republic founded on the teachings of
Locke, Rousseau, Montesquieu, where common citizens aren't
libel to "Spanish Inquisitions," and doctors are?173
pediatric staff of Massachusetts General Hospital. Id. at 660.
Another witness was the Health Director of Newport News, and former
commanding officer of the Fort Eustis, Virginia Army Hospital where Dr. Cypress had
been employed as a civilian pediatrician. He testified: "Well, in my twenty-nine years of
practice of medicine, I have never been associated with a better pediatrician than Dr.
George C. Cypress and I would recommend him for any staff." Id.
The Director of Surgery at Morrisania Hospital in New York, who was also a
Professor of Clinical Surgery at New York University and Bellevue Medical Center,
testified from his observation of Dr. Scott that "he had almost.., flawless technique"
and was technically "well above average." He would be happy to have a man of Dr.
Scott's caliber at his hospital "as an example for a group of residents not only about how
to do surgery" but about other things as well. Id. at 660-61.
170. Id. at 665.
171. See Byrd & Clayton, supra note 115, at 415.
172. Id.
173. Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986: Hearing on H.R. 5540 Before the
Subcomm. on Civil and Civil and Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th
Cong. 2 (1986) (statement of W. Michael Byrd).
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IV. Federal Civil Rights Laws and Legislative Reform
It may prove difficult to use existing civil rights laws to address
the exclusion of minority providers from managed care. This section
analyzes the legal and practical difficulties of prevailing under Title
VII and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Finding these civil
rights remedies lacking, this article proposes that congress modify
existing provisions of the Social Security Act to require the collection
of race and ethnicity data by MCOs receiving funding under
Medicare and Medicaid.
A. Title VII
Title V11174 ensures equal opportunity of employment and may
not be well suited to address racial discrimination in the medical
market. Under many managed care organizational arrangements,
minority physicians would likely be considered independent
contractors, a class not protected under Title VII, which only
addresses discrimination in the employer-employee relationship.17 5
Only physicians in staff model HMOs, who usually sign
employment contracts with the HMO and receive a salary from the
HMO, seem clearly protected under Title VII. Courts holding that
independent contractors are not protected may still find coverage
based on an employers' exercise of significant control over the
independent contractor's business. 176
Surprisingly little case law applies the "control test" to the
MCO/physician-contractor relationship. In one of the few reported
cases, Petrovich v. Share Heath Plan of Illinois,177 the court held that
the MCO's use of capitation as a method of payment, its quality
assurance program and its use of primary care physicians as
gatekeepers were sufficient to defeat Share's summary judgment
motion on the issue of whether it controlled the manner in which
physicians worked.1 78 It is equally likely, however, that other courts
174. Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (2003).
175. Id. § 2000e-2 (prohibiting employers from discriminating against any individual
or from classifying any individual on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin). The statute defines an employer as any entity with more than fifteen persons
engaged in an industry affecting commerce. Id. § 2000e(b).
176. See Vahharia v. Swedish Covenant Hosp., 109 F.3d 799 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding a
hospital anesthesiologist was an independent contractor); Wortham v. Am. Family Ins.
Group, 385 F.3d 1139 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding an insurance agent was an independent
contractor).
177. 513 N.E.2d 833 (1999).
178. Id. at 25.
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would view these same features as a means to control the details,
rather than the methods of work.
Even assuming that a minority physician can show that she is
covered under Title VI, without direct evidence of discrimination,
the aggrieved physician would have to prove a disparate impact
claim.179 Establishing a prima facie case would be very difficult for
two reasons. First, statistical evidence is usually required to
demonstrate that an inordinately high number of qualified minority
physicians were excluded because of the selection and de-selection
criteria. However, MCOs do not collect racial and ethnic provider
data. Second, the MCO could easily rebut the presumption of
discrimination by proving that the selection and de-selection criteria
are consistent with business necessity.180 MCOs asserting that these
criteria are vital to ensuring cost-effective and high quality care
would likely prevail.
B. Title VI
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964181 has served as the
primary legal tool for redressing discrimination in health care. Title
VI prohibits recipients of federal financial assistance, including
hospitals, nursing homes, and doctors who accept Medicaid or
Medicare from discriminating on the basis of race, color, or national
origin.1 82 The statute prohibits intentional discrimination and its
implementing regulations prohibit facially neutral policies and
practices that have a disproportionately adverse impact on
minorities, even in the absence of discrimination.183
179. To establish a prima facie case of disparate impact under Title VII, the plaintiff
must show that a challenged employment practice caused a statistical disparity with
respect to the number of protected class members in the workforce in comparison to the
number of protected class members in the relevant labor market. In other words, a
plaintiff must demonstrate not only the disparity but also that the disparity is a result of
the employment practice in question. See, e.g., Steward v. Gwaltney of Smithfield Ltd.,
954 F. Supp. 1118 (E.D. Va. 1996), affd, 103 F.3d 120 (4th Cir. 1996).
180. Title VII requires a defendant to prove the legitimacy of the challenged criteria.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A). If a defendant succeeds in demonstrating the legitimacy
of its selection criteria, an excluded minority physician still may prevail if she can prove
that the defendant's explanation is merely a pretext for the discriminatory business
practice. See id. at 660-61.
181. See 42 U.S.C § 2000d-2000d-4 (2003).
182. See id.
183. These regulations prohibit "criteria or methods of administration which have the
effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, or national
origin, or have the effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the
objectives of the program as respect individuals of a particular race, color, or national
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A Title VI approach is complicated by the fact that the
Department of Health and Human Services has not provided any
guidance as to whether Title VI applies to MCOs. State court
decisions discussing tort liability of MCOs are instructive. In recent
years, some courts have held that MCOs are subject to the same
duty of care as hospitals. In Shannon v. McNulty, the court applied
the corporate negligence doctrine applicable to hospitals to an
HMO, emphasizing that MCOs perform the same or similar
function as hospitals. 184  Other courts also view MCOs as
functionally similar to hospitals. 185 These decisions provide some
support for viewing MCOs as hospitals for Title VI purposes. Thus,
if an MCO participates in Medicare or Medicaid through one of its
product lines, it presumably would be considered a recipient of
federal funds and its health care operations presumably subject to
civil rights oversight.
Assuming that a minority physician can prove that she is
protected under Title VI, she may have considerable difficulty
proving a Title VI claim. In an intentional discrimination claim, the
plaintiff must prove motive.186 In a claim alleging disproportionate
adverse impact, the plaintiff must identify a particular racially
neutral policy or practice that has a statistically significant adverse
effect on a protected racial or ethnic group.187 Once the plaintiff
establishes this prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant
to justify the challenged practice by establishing a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the policy or practice. 88
origin. See 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(1)(vii)(2) (2002). For a history of the case law upholding
these regulations, see Sidney D. Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI: Defending Health Care
Discrimination - It Shouldn't Be So Easy, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 939, 948-55 (1990).
184. In Shannon, 718 A.2d 828 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998), the court emphasized:
[W]e recognize the central role played by HMOs in the total health care of its
subscribers. A great deal of today's healthcare is channeled through HMOs
with the subscribers being given little or no say so in the stewardship of their
care. Specifically, while these providers do not practice medicine, they do
involve themselves daily in decisions affecting their subscriber's medical care.
These decisions may, among others, limit the length of hospital stays, restrict
access to therapy, or prevent rendering of emergency room care ... Where the
HMO is providing health care services rather than merely providing money to
pay for services their conduct should be subject to scrutiny. We see no reason
why the duties applicable to hospitals should not be equally applied to an
HMO when that HMO is performing the same or similar functions as a
hospital. Id. at 832
185. See Boyd v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
186. See Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1407 (11th Cir. 1993).
187. See Watson, supra note 183, at 948-49.
188. See Elston, 977 F.2d at 1407 (holding that even if the defendant can establish a
legitimate non-discriminatory reason, the plaintiff may still prevail by demonstrating
that the health care provider's legitimate interest can be met by using a less
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Motive is practically impossible to prove in an intentional
discrimination claim.189 As with Title VII litigation, minority
physicians lack the data likely needed to support a disparate impact
claim. Moreover, the defendants' Title VI burden is lower than
under Title VII,190 and for that reason, MCOs can easily provide
legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for the challenged criteria.
One of the major difficulties in using Title VI to redress health
care discrimination is that Title VI, unlike other Titles of the 1964
Civil Rights Act, depends primarily on administrative rather than
judicial enforcement. The Department of Health and Human
Services, Office of Civil Rights (DHHS/OCR) has the primary
responsibility for ensuring that federally funded health care
providers comply with Title VI. 191 Individuals have a private right
of action to pursue claims of intentional discrimination, but only
DHHS/OCR can enforce claims of disparate impact
discrimination. 192 Chronically under-funded and under-staffed,
DHHS/OCR's Title VI enforcement record is poor.193
The Humana federal court litigation, which is discussed above,
illustrates the practical difficulties physicians of color face in using
Title VI to obtain relief from managed care's exclusionary practices.
Having no private right of action, plaintiffs would have been forced
to rely on OCR complaint investigations that are replete with
problems, including delays and understaffing. A seven-year delay
is not unusual. 194 Further, the lack of data on terminations by race
presented an insurmountable obstacle. Plaintiffs rightly sought
discriminatory alternative).
189. See Watson, supra note 183, at 948-49.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001). Sandoval involved a Title VI claim
against the Alabama Department of Public Safety. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the
department's practice of administering driver's license tests in English alleging that the
practice violated Title VI because of its disparate impact on those with limited English
proficiency. A fractured court held that private individuals do not have a private right
of action to sue to enforce the Title VI disparate impact regulations. However, many
commentators believe that Sandoval does not foreclose a section 1983 action to enforce
Title VI disparate impact regulations against a governmental actor. See Leading Cases,
115 HARV. L. REV. 487 (2001).
193. In 1999, the United States Commission on Civil Rights criticized Title VI
enforcement efforts in the area of health care: the Commission's report pointed out that
the nondiscrimination provisions have not been fully enforced and implemented by
DHHS/OCR. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE HEALTH CARE CHALLENGE:
ACKNOWLEDGING DISPARITY, CONFRONTING DISCRIMINATION, AND ENSURING EQUALITY:
A REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS 6 (1999).
194. See Marianne Engleman Lado, Unfinished Agenda: The Need for Civil Rights
Litigation to Address Race Discrimination and Inequalities in Health Care Delivery, 6 TEX. F.
ON C.L. & C.R. 32-33 (2001).
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relief under Florida state law remedies, which may not be available
to plaintiffs in other states.
C. Federal Policy Levers: Medicare and Medicaid
Collecting racial data is necessary if racial discrimination in
managed care is to be identified and proven. The federal
government does not routinely collect provider or patient racial data
in health care.' 95 To date, nearly all private and foundation-
supported data collection efforts have focused on patient race and
ethnicity. 196 It is not sufficient to have data about health plan
members alone. Provider race is a risk factor that ties into the
delivery of appropriate medical care.
Recognizing this, on March 5, 2003, Aetna announced plans to
collect data on the race and ethnicity of Aetna's network of
participating physicians in a number of ways, including voluntary
provider surveys.1 97  Aetna stated that the collection of this
information will allow the company to address the cultural
competency of its provider network and assess their ability to meet
the racial, ethnic, cultural and linguistic preferences of its member
population. 198 Only a handful of MCOs have followed Aetna's
lead.199
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) have
mandated Quality Assessment and Performance Improvement
(QAPI) initiatives as a condition of participation in Medicare
Advantage plans,200 and Medicaid managed care plans.201 "Quality
assessment" requires health plans to measure scientifically validated
indicators of care such as vaccination rates and health screening
rates. 202 "Performance improvement" requires plans to use targeted
195. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ELIMINATING HEALTH DISPARITIES:
MEASUREMENT AND DATA NEEDS (Michele Ver Ploeg & Edward Perrin eds., 2004).
196. See AMERICA'S HEALTH INSURANCE PLANS, COLLECTION OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC
DATA BY HEALTH PLANS To ADDRESS DISPARITIES: FINAL SUMMARY REPORT. (2005)
[hereinafter "AMERICA'S HEALTH INSURANCE PLANS"].
197. AETNA, AETNA ANNOUNCES INITIATIVES TO REDUCE THE RISK ASSOCIATED WITH
RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE (2003), available at
http://www.aetna.com/news/2003/pr_-20030305.htm.
198. Id.
199. See AMERICA'S HEALTH INSURANCE PLANS, supra note 196, at 13.
200. See 42 U.S.C § 1395w-22(e); 42 C.F.R § 422.152 (2005). The Medicare
Modernization Act changed the name of private Medicare managed care plans from
Medicare+Choice to Medicare Advantage.
201. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-2(c); 42 C.F.R. § 438.240 (2003).
202. See 42 C.F.R § 422.152; see also Sidney D. Watson, Equity Measures and Systems
Reform as Tools For Reducing Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Health Care (Commonwealth
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interventions in specific areas, set goals, and collect data to measure
performance improvements. 203
In 2000, Congress amended the Social Security Act to require
that QAPI programs include a separate focus on racial and ethnic
minorities. 204 In 2003, CMS gave private Medicare managed care
plans a choice; either focus on (1) culturally and linguistically
appropriate services (CLAS initiatives), or (2) health disparities
affecting Native Americans, Asian Americans, African Americans
and Latinos/as (Equity initiatives). 205 CMS has provided plenty of
technical support for plans choosing to implement the CLAS
initiatives, but done little, if anything, to support plans choosing to
implement Equity initiatives. 206 It is unclear how many plans have
chosen to measure racial and ethnic minority health disparities. 207
Just as guidance is needed for CLAS initiatives, guidance is also
needed for Equity initiatives.
Although CMS appears to have the regulatory authority to
require Medicare MCOs to collect physician race and ethnicity data
to support Equity initiatives, current QAPI requirements do not
mandate that health plans engage in Equity initiatives, or track
performance data by race and ethnicity. 208 Equity measures that fail
to track race and ethnicity likely miss obvious inequities in the
medical treatment provided to patients of color. Equally important,
race-blind Equity initiatives likely ignore the quality-enhancing role
of race-concordant patient/ physician relationships.
Equity and fairness are generally considered fundamental
concepts that guide the distribution of social insurance benefits. 209
Fund, Publication No. 776, 2005).
203. See 42 C.F.R. § 438.240; Watson, supra note 202, at 2-4.
204. See HR 5661 § 616(b)(5)(b), 106th Cong., 2, (2000), codified at 42 U.S.C. 1395w-
222(e).
205. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Medicare Managed Care Manual,
Chapter 5, section 20.3.3.1, March 18, 2005.
206. See Watson, supra note 202, at 7; Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality,
Oral, Linguistic, and Culturally Competent Services: Guides for Managed Care Plans, Feb.
2003, available at http://www.ahrq.gov/about/cods/cultcomp.htm.
207. See Watson, supra note 202, at 7.
208. See Watson, supra note 202, at 9-10. Professor Sidney Watson has shown that
CMS' interpretation of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and
Modernization Act allows the agency sufficient authority to require Medicare
Advantage plans to submit quality and performance measures stratified by race and
ethnicity. Collecting provider race and ethnicity data is arguably consistent with the
agency's health care disparities regulations because such provider composition data is
among the indices of the quality of care ethnic and racial minorities receive under
private Medicare managed care health plans. Medicare Managed Care Manual, Chapter 5
§ 20.3.3.1.
209. See STRENGTHENING COMMUNITY: SOCIAL INSURANCE IN A DIvERSE AMERICA 3
(Kathleen Buto et al. eds., 2004).
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Managed care, however, is not structured in a manner that assigns
equal weight to the preferences and outcomes of minority patients.
Revising QAPI requirements is one way that Congress can level the
playing field by requiring MCOs to assess equity and fairness
through the lens of race and ethnicity. This would bring into sharp
focus the bond between minority providers and minority patients.
Considerations of this sort suggest that Congress should
strongly consider amending the various sections of the Social
Security Act that mandate QAPI programs for private MCOs
providing Medicare and Medicaid health plans. Specifically,
congress should: (1) require that private managed care Medicare
and Medicaid plans engage in Equity initiatives as well as CLAS
initiatives, (2) require that equity data be stratified by race, ethnicity
and gender, and (3) mandate that managed care Medicare and
Medicaid plans provide data on the racial and ethnic composition of
provider networks. Congress is currently considering a number of
revisions to the NMA. This provides a perfect opportunity to
consider issues of equity and fairness in the provision of Medicare
and Medicaid services by MCOs.
V. State and Local Legislation and Reforms
The foregoing discussion suggests that existing federal civil
rights laws are not up to the challenge of correcting market-based
health care discrimination. Congress can modify existing Social
Security regulations, but this requires a great deal of political will
and a commitment to racial equity in health care. Simply put, our
society has failed to identify and describe the health needs of
minority Americans as a problem of sufficient urgency and
magnitude so as to attract broad coalitions capable of commanding
attention and initiating a political discourse about federal solutions.
Local and state governments, however, have acted to correct
some of the race and class-based injustices in managed care's
provider selection and de-selection process. These remedies focus
on equity and due process.
A. Provider Diversity Ordinances
On March 21, 1996, the Baltimore City Council passed the
nation's only city ordinance that requires MCOs contracting with
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the city to have minority doctors and dentists as plan providers.210
The Ethnically Diverse Health Care Panels ordinance does not use
quotas or give preferential treatment to minority providers. Instead,
the ordinance provides that the ethnic diversity of the provider
panel is among the criteria the city will use to award health services
contracts for city employees. 211 The story of the origins of the
Baltimore ordinance illustrates the complex interplay between race
and profit-driven business decisions, and the struggle of black
physicians to protect their patients and themselves.
Managed care health plans were attracted to Maryland because
of its affluence and the presence of nationally renowned medical
centers such as Johns Hopkins. 212 The Baltimore strategy was
simple: Enter the market by first signing up patients in the
predominately white suburbs to ensure the largest profits, a
business practice know as "cherry picking." As competition
increased, health plans began expanding their provider networks by
targeting middle-and working-class black patients, the mainstay of
black physician practices. 213 City employees, in particular, were
aggressively targeted. Black physicians reported hearing stories
from their patients of being wined and dined by managed care
plans, promised cheaper coverage than their traditional Blue
Cross/Blue Shield plan, and promised continued coverage for visits
to black physicians they were currently seeing. 214
The promise of continued coverage for black providers proved
untrue. For instance, members of the nearly two-thirds black
teacher's union, which had signed on with an HMO, were given a
book that contained their list of providers; of the 27 primary care
physicians listed, only one was black and all others white.21 5 Black
physicians and patients alike were outraged. Some patients refused
210. JOURNAL CITY COUNCIL BALTIMORE, March 21, 1996 (codified at BALTIMORE, MD.,
CODE Art. 1 § 27 (1998)).
211. Id. § 27 (C) ("Any person who submits to the city a bid or who contracts with the
city to be a heath care carrier or to provide health care services to Baltimore city
employees or persons receiving health care through any entity funded by the city shall
prequalify... criteria for the prequalification of health care carriers shall include, but not
be limited to: (1) Experience Levels (2) Financial History and (3) Ethnic diversity of their
respective provider panels.").
212. All Things Considered, National Public Radio, Minority Doctors Say They Can't
Get Into HMOs, Nov. 14, 1996 (copy of transcript on file with author).
213. See National Public Radio, supra note 212.
214. Id. According to Dr. Lenox Dingle: "[MCOs] had a picnic and invited [black
patients'] families and had entertainment and some games. And basically what they did
is sold these teachers into purchasing a health care plan. It was cheaper than their
traditional Blue Cross and Blue Shield card. But they said that, you know, we'll--you'll
have me covered as well."
215. Id.
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to choose a primary care physician.216 The local NMA chapter
received numerous complaints from members alleging that their
applications for membership in provider networks had been
rejected. The most common explanation for the rejection, when one
was given, was that the network had been filled. Other members
alleged that they were dropped from the network shortly after being
listed as a participating provider. 217
Black physicians and dentists initially sought relief from the
Maryland General Assembly. Black legislators drafted and
introduced an HMO diversity bill aimed at prohibiting
discrimination by HMOs, preserving the relationship between
minority patients and their physicians, protecting the quality and
availability of health care to underserved populations, and
expanding the business opportunities of minority providers. 218 The
bill never reached the floor for a vote.
The physicians and dentists shifted the focus to the local level,
asking the Baltimore City Council to pass an ordinance that would
require HMOs to accept more black doctors into citywide health
plans. 219  At first, the city council passed a January 29, 1996,
resolution urging the General Assembly to adopt the HMO
Diversity Bill.220 The resolution expressed the city council's view on
216. Id.
217. Black Baltimore area physicians frequently turned to the press to air their
grievances. The Baltimore Sun published a number of articles describing their
complaints. Some of the personal narratives include Dr. Willlarda V. Edwards, an
internist, who tells of applying to more than half a dozen HMOs operating in the
Baltimore region and being turned down by each one. At the time, she had a large
practice in a working and middle class suburb, had never been sued, and was the
president of a medical association that represented almost 300 black doctors in the
Baltimore region. Dr. Edwards thought the she was turned down because her patients
tend to be sicker: "It's about making a profit. And so they want well patients. Then they
want doctors who have the low-cost patients. I see it as discrimination." See Diana K.
Sugg, Black Doctors Feel Chill at HMOs, THE BALTIMORE SUN, Nov. 8, 1995, at Al.
Complaints about de-selection include those of Dr. Francine Higgs-Shipman, a
board-certified internist, who describes how she first lost 300 patients when Prudential
HMO dropped her, and then lost an additional 100 patients when Cigna dropped her.
According to Dr. Higgs-Shipman, Cigna informed her that she was spending too much
money per patient. Id. Black dentists, such as Billy D. Davis also complained of being
dropped. Dr. Davis claimed that he and several of his colleagues were the targets of
intense HMO scrutiny and were removed from HMO provider lists or denied access.
See Robert Guy Matthews, Bill to Force HMOs to Take More Black Doctors Stalls; Hearing
Panel Cites Weaknesses in Proposal to Quell Alleged Racism, THE BALTIMORE SUN, Nov. 9,
1995, at B5.
218. H.B. 116, 1995 Leg., 7th Sess. (Md. 1995).
219. See Robert Guy Matthews, Council Gives Okay to HMO Diversity Bill, THE
BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 26, 1996, at B3.
220. Baltimore City Council, Resolution 30, Jan. 29, 1996, reprinted in Journal City
Council of Baltimore, Jan. 29,1996 (copy on file with author).
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managed care and people of color:
While the nation's health care industry moves towards managed
care, a disproportionate percentage of minority health care
providers have been systematically denied access to or excluded
from the managed care system [and] ... the exclusion from the
managed care system of minority health providers, who are
experienced in the special health needs of minority patients will
deleteriously affect the quality of treatment and care delivered to
minority patients. 221
Copies of the resolution were sent to the Governor of Maryland,
the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House. 2 2 Lacking
a response from the General Assembly, the Baltimore City Council
drafted and adopted the March 1996 Ethnically Diverse Health Care
Panels.
The Baltimore ordinance provides an incentive for MCOs to
diversify, or, at a minimum, requires MCOs to think about issues of
race and ethnicity. Because provider network racial and ethnic
diversity is only one factor among several the city considers before
awarding health care contracts, the ordinance is consistent with
recent court decisions discussing issues of race and diversity.223
Physicians of color excluded from provider networks in other large
cities, especially those with substantial minority populations, should
carefully consider the Baltimore example and seek relief at the local
level.
B. State Legislative Responses
Nearly every state has some law or administrative regulation
that provides consumer protection or provider protection against
MCO practices. Most of these statutes were passed during the 1990s
as part of a widespread and deep-seated "backlash" against the
perceived overreaching of managed care and market forces in health
care. Scholars from both ends of the political spectrum have
soundly criticized these laws. From the left, Deborah Stone argues
that they cater to the interests of people with insurance and divert
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (stating that the use of race as one
factor in law school admissions is allowable to achieve diversity); see also City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (plurality opinion) (stating that racial preferences
in city contracting may be used only to remedy government's participation in industry-
wide race discrimination).
[Vol. 4
MEDICAL CIVIL RIGHTS
attention from the plight of those with no insurance. 224 From the
right, Clark Havighurst argues that the standards set by these laws
are designed to suit the preferences of an aware, affluent, and
politically active minority, and the interests of health care providers,
at the expense of ordinary consumers who are denied the freedom
to spend their limited incomes in ways that maximize their
welfare. 225
These observations are likely true as they pertain to much
consumer protection legislation, but they ignore the equalizing role
of certain provider protection laws such as patient advocacy laws
and anti-gag rule legislation, that vindicate the rights of physicians
while allowing them to fulfill their fiduciary obligation to act on the
patients' behalf. Laws of this sort "equalize" by altering the balance
of power between providers, consumers, and MCOs. 226
At least twelve states have enacted health care provider "due
process" laws.227 These laws attempt to equalize by providing some
measure of due process protection to "difficult" or "unpopular"
providers and allow consumers continuity of care. The statutes
differ in the amount of protection provided. For instance, the
Delaware statute offers little protection, requiring health plans to
provide written notice of the reasons for termination or non-renewal
of a provider contract only if the physician requests such notice
within twenty days, 228 and requiring only "administrative review"
of the termination, without specifying the parameters of the
review. 229
On the other hand, the New York due process statute is much
more protective. First of all, it clearly enumerates the procedures
that constitute adequate due process. The statute requires: (1) a
written explanation of the reasons for the proposed termination;230
(2) notice that providers are entitled to request a hearing or review
by a panel appointed by the health care plan;231 (3) a hearing before
that panel, a third of whose members must be clinicians in the same
224. See Deborah Stone, Managed Care and the Second Great Transformation, 24 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 1213 (1999).
225. See Clark Havighurst, The Backlash Against Managed Health Care: Hard Politics
Make Bad Policy, 34 IND. L. REV. 398 (2001)
226. See Linda C. Fentiman, Patient Advocacy and Termination from Managed Care
Organizations: Do State Laws Protecting Health Care Professional Advocacy Make Any
Difference?, 82 NEB. L. REV. 508, 511-12 (2003).
227. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 494 (2000).
228. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 3339(c) (2003).
229. Id.
230. N.Y. PUB HEALTH LAW § 4406-d(2)(a)-(b)(i) (2005).
231. Id. § 4406-d(2)(b)(2). The statute also requires reasonable time limits for actions
that are short enough to ensure that the process does not drag out interminably but long
enough to permit a provider to prepare and present a case.
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specialty as the physician under review; 232 and (4) written notice of
the panel's decision. 233The statute also lists impermissible reasons
for contract termination. Specifically, the statute states that a
physician cannot be terminated from a preferred provider list for:
(1) advocating on behalf of an enrollee; (2) filing a complaint against
the health care plan; (3) appealing a decision of the health care plan;
(4) providing information or filing a report; or (5) requesting a
hearing or review.234
Of particular importance, the statute requires case mix
adjustment. Health care plans are required to look beyond
economic profiling numbers and measure individual physician
economic profiles against other physicians serving comparable
patient populations.235 Further, a physician threatened with de-
selection must also have the opportunity to review the data and
"discuss the unique nature of the [physician's] patient population
which may have a bearing on the [physician's] profile and to work
cooperatively with the health plan to improve performance." 236
More specifically, New York requires MCOs to (1) develop
methodologies to collect and analyze health care provider profiling
data in consultation with providers, (2) use the data to evaluate
providers against objective agreed upon criteria and to compare
providers who treat comparable patient population, (3) have
policies and procedures to ensure that providers are informed of the
information which is used to evaluate their performance, (4) disclose
these data periodically to providers, and (5) provide providers with
an opportunity to respond to the MCOs assessment of their
performance, including clarification of the nature of their patient
population, and working cooperatively with the MCO to improve
their performance. 237
In race-neutral terms, the statute effectively addresses many of
the concerns raised by physicians of color who have been dropped
from provider networks. The case mix adjustment provision
potentially provides an accurate assessment of physician cost-
effectiveness by requiring managed care health plans to take into
account the fact that physicians of color disproportionately care for
sicker, poorer and more costly patients. A well-crafted law of this
type can provide essential ammunition for physicians of color to
232. Id. § 4406-d(2)(c).
233. Id. § 4406-d and e. Exceptions to the statute are provided for cases involving
imminent harm to patient care, fraud, or a final disciplinary action by a government
agency that "impairs the [physician's] ability to practice [medicine]." Id. § 4406-d(2)(a).
234. Id. § 4406-d(5).
235. Id. § 4406-d(4).
236. Id.
237. Id.
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defend against claims that they were terminated because of
"inefficiency" or "high deficits," because the statute requires that
MCOs provide relatively objective criteria, chosen in advance by the
MCO, by which the physician's satisfaction of their contract
requirements can be measured.
A major shortcoming, however, is that the statute does not
explicitly provide for any means of enforcement. The New York
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, reached that issue in Foong v.
Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield,238 and found an implied right of
action within the statute. In that case, defendant health plan
terminated plaintiff's contract on the basis of imminent harm to
patients, but waited thirteen months after first notifying him of his
alleged substandard care. 239 The New York County Medical Society
later found that plaintiff had demonstrated sound medical practice.
Plaintiff sued the Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield for breach of
contract and breach of the common law duty of good faith and fair
dealing.240 The court held that plaintiff has an implied private right
of action under the statute, allowing the claims to proceed in state
court. 241 Further, the court made clear that termination actions by
health plans, including associated peer review decisions, are subject
to judicial review. 242
Another key question is whether ERISA243 preempts provider
due process statutes. In Kentucky Association of Health Plans v.
Miller,244 the Supreme Court abandoned its precedents and crafted a
new and clearer approach to the ERISA preemption problem. At
issue was Kentucky's "any willing provider" statute. 245
The Court's prior ERISA "savings clause" analysis had created
substantial confusion. Basically, a state regulation that has some
effect on an MCO is preempted, unless the law is one that the state
has enacted to regulate the business of insurance. 246 In Kentucky
238. 762 N.Y.S.2d 348 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003).
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1003 (2000)
244. 538 U.S. 329 (2003).
245. Id.
246. The savings clause is found in 29 U.S.C.A. § 114(b)(2)(A). In its early cases
interpreting this clause, the Court read it conservatively, applying both a "common
sense" as well as a three part test developed in antitrust cases applying the McCarran-
Ferguson Act for determining whether a law regulated the business of insurance. See
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985). In the late 1990s,
however, the Court began to back off of its earlier mechanical and restrictive approach.
See UNUM Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358 (1999) (stating that the McCarran-
Ferguson factors were merely relevant factors to a determination of whether the savings
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Association, Plaintiff health plans had argued that the law was not
saved from ERISA preemption because it was not directed at the
insurance industry and applied equally to health care providers. In
rejecting this position, the Court announced a new two-part saving
clause analysis:
Today we make a clean break from the McCarran-Ferguson
factors and hold that for a state law to be deemed a law... which
regulates insurance under § 1144 (b)(2)(A), it must satisfy two
requirements. First the state law must be specifically directed
toward entities engaged in insurance. Second ... the state law
must substantially affect the risk pooling arrangement between
the insurer and the insured.247
Earlier in the opinion the court had interpreted the "risk
pooling" requirement as follows: "We have never held that state
laws must alter or control the actual terms of insurance policies to be
deemed laws.., which regulate insurance under § 1144(b)(2)(A); it
suffices that they substantially affect the risk pooling arrangement
between insurer and insured." 248
The Court reasoned that the laws were specifically directed
toward entities engaged in insurance because the law imposed no
legal obligations on physician providers. 249 The Court also reasoned
that by restricting health plans' ability to limit the number of
providers with access to their network, the law also restricted the
ability of health plans to offer lower payments to providers in
exchange for the assurance of high patient volume. 250 This, in turn,
"substantially affected the risk pooling arrangement between the
clause should apply and not conclusive).
Section 2 of the McCarran-Ferguson Act provides:
(a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject
to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of
such business.
(b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede
any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or
which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically
relates to the business of insurance: Provided, That after June 30, 1948, the Act of
July 2, 1890, as amended, known as the Sherman Act, and the Act of October 15,
1914, as amended, known as the Clayton Act, and the Act of September 26,
1914, known as the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, shall be
applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not
regulated by State law.
59 Stat. 34, 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (emphasis added).
247. Ky. Ass'n of Health Plans v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 341-42 (2003).
248. Id. at 338.
249. Id. at 335.
250. Id. at 335-36.
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insurer and the insured" because the law prohibited Kentucky's
insureds from seeking insurance through a closed network of health
care providers in exchange for lower premiums.25'
Kentucky Association significantly clarifies and expands the
coverage of ERISA's saving clause, allowing more state laws
regulating MCOs to escape preemption. Applying the Court's
analysis to provider due process laws, these laws are specifically
directed toward entities engaged in insurance because like
Kentucky's "any willing provider" law, the due process legislation
does not impose any obligation on providers. The second Kentucky
Association prong is also likely met. First, by restricting the ability of
MCOs to terminate providers without costly due process
procedures, it thereby limits heath plan's ability to offer discounted
rates to providers in exchange for lower due process protection.
This, in turn, "substantially affects the type of risk pooling
arrangements that insurers may offer insured" because the law
restricts New York's insured from seeking insurance from a network
of providers lacking due process protections in exchange for lower
premiums.
In sum, provider due process statutes, like New York's, provide
physicians of color much needed protection against unfair
terminations, and appear to escape ERISA preemption. Having less
leverage and negotiating power than other provider groups,
physicians of color benefit most from due process statutes. As law
Professor Rebecca Zietlow observes, individuals who have faced
historical discrimination, including women, people of color and the
poor, have more to gain from formal procedures. 25 2 Decision-
makers are less likely to act on prejudice if they are constrained by
formal procedures. 253  Procedural protections also limit power
imbalances by allowing individuals to participate in decisions that
affect their lives. 254
One limitation is that the due process statutes address
terminations only, while many physicians of color allege that they
are rejected in the first instance. A more protective statute should
include some explanation for the rejection as well as proof that the
251. Id. at 342.
252. See Rebecca Zietlow, Giving Substance to the Due Process Counterrevolution, 75 DEN.
U. L. REV. 9, 32 (1997).
253. Id. See also Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of
Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359, 1387-89 (stating that
without procedural formalities, decision-makers are more likely to be swayed by
prejudice); Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1076 (1984) (stating that
poorer parties are disadvantaged in the bargaining process because of their limited
resources to finance litigation).
254. See Fiss, supra note 253, at 1077-78.
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reasons given are not pretexual. Further, the enforcement
mechanism should be stated clearly.
C. Judicial responses
Physicians have traditionally been considered independent
contractors when providing services to MCOs and hospitals. 255
Under such circumstances, MCOs have inserted "termination
without cause" provisions, and the courts have routinely upheld
them under theories of breach of contract, antitrust analysis, and
constitutional law.256
Since the mid-1990s, however, courts have issued a number of
significant opinions concerning the ability of MCOs to de-select
physicians from their managed care networks by exercising their
rights under without cause termination provisions in provider
agreements. These cases apply contract principles in finding that a
termination is either void as against public policy, or violates the
common law of fair procedure. 257
In Harper v. Healthsource New Hampshire, Inc.,258 Dr. Harper, a
primary and surgical care provider, had participated in the
physician network established by Healthsource New Hampshire
since its inception in 1985, and approximately thirty-forty percent of
255. Raglin v. HMO Ill., Inc., 585 N.E.2d 153, 156 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) ("In this case
there seems to be no question that HMOI is an IPA model health maintenance
organization and, therefore, does not directly employ its own physicians.... For this
reason the medical groups, and thus the physicians who work within the medical group,
may be considered independent contractors...."); Biddle v. Sartori Mem'l Hosp., 518
N.W.2d 795, 797 (Iowa 1994) ("a physician is customarily regarded as an independent
contractor, not an employee of the facility served.")
256. Bryan A. Liang, Deselection under Harper v. Healthsource: A Blow for Maintaining
Patient-Physician Relationships in the Era of Managed Care, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 799,
845-49 (collecting and summarizing cases).
257. The California Supreme Court recently relied on the common law of fair
procedure in Potvin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 22 Cal. 4th 1060 (2000). Regarding de-
selection from a preferred provider list, the court stated that the right of fair procedure
"does not apply to an insurer's removal of a physician from its preferred provider list
unless the insurer possesses power so substantial that the removal significantly impairs
the ability of an ordinary, competent physician to practice medicine or a medical
specialty in a particular geographic area, thereby affecting an important, substantial
economic interest." Id. at 1072-73. Even when the right applies, the court stated that an
insurer is free to de-select a physician from its preferred provider list, so long as the
decision is "substantively rational and procedurally fair." Id. This decision is helpful to
minority physicians in states like California and Pennsylvania that have a common law
right of fair procedure.
258. 674 A.2d 962 (N.H. 1996)
[Vol. 4
MEDICAL CIVIL RIGHTS
Dr. Harper's patient base was Healthsource-related. 259
Healthsource's participation agreement with Dr. Harper permitted
the HMO to terminate the relationship both with and without
cause. 260
In 1994, Dr. Harper concluded that Healthsource had been
manipulating his patients' treatment records. After notifying
Healthsource of his concern, Healthsource informed Dr. Harper that
it was terminating his participation agreement for cause because he
had not satisfied the HMOs re-credentialing criteria. Dr. Harper
appealed this decision within Healthsource, and, ultimately,
Healthsource's Executive Management Committee overturned the
decision to terminate Dr. Harper for cause but decided to terminate
him without cause. 261 Dr. Harper sued Healthsource, alleging
numerous causes of action, including violations of public policy and
due process. The trial court granted Healthsource's motion to
dismiss.262
The New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed, finding the
termination without cause provision is limited by the implied
covenant of good faith and by public policy. It concluded that a
physician is entitled to review of a de-selection decision to
determine whether the decision "comport[ed] with the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing and [whether it was] made for a reason
that is contrary to public policy." 263 According to the court, the
public has a substantial interest in the relationship between HMOs
and provider doctors. 264 In light of Dr. Harper's allegation that his
termination without cause constituted retaliation for his attempts to
correct patient records, the court determined that his claim that
Healthsource's termination decision had been made in bad faith or
in a manner contrary to public policy should be heard.265
The Harper court, however, did not reject termination without
cause provisions in all physician/HMO disputes. The physician
must show that the HMO terminated the relationship without cause
and the physician must believe that the decision to terminate was
made in bad faith or on a basis contrary to public policy. 266 The
259. Id. at 963.
260. Id. at 964.
261. Id. at 963-64.
262. Id. at 964.
263. Id. at 965.
264. Id. at 966 (finding that the doctor-patient relationship is one of many which are
afforded a special place by society, and that similar values are reflected in New
Hampshire statutes which require preferred provider agreements to be fair and in the
public interest).
265. Id. at 966-67.
266. Id.
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Harper "public policy" defense is especially important to physicians
of color who frequently allege that they were terminated from
health plans because their patients are sicker and cost the plan too
much money. As Liang has suggested, this defense should be used
to preserve the patient-physician relationship if the physician has
patients who are vulnerable and wish to continue the
relationship. 267 For those minority physicians not protected by due
process statutes or diversity ordinances, the Harper "public policy"
defense is an avenue worth pursuing.
Conclusion
Managed care joins together three actors -insurers, physicians
and health care institutions -each having a history of discrimination
against physicians of color and the patients they serve. Factor in the
profit motive, and the situation is ripe for unfair treatment. While
MCOs do not appear to purposefully discriminate, the use of
historical and race-blind selection and de-selection criteria
inaccurately measure the efficiency and the quality of care provided
by minority physicians.
While a strong argument can be made for race-conscious
remedies, there are a host of practical and legal issues associated
with mandates requiring either race-pairing or specific numbers of
minority physician providers. For this reason, remedies that do not
specifically exclude white physicians are advisable. Well-drafted
physician due process statutes and diversity ordinances implicitly
consider physician and patient race and ethnicity without
penalizing majority group providers. Further, Equity initiatives that
require the collection of both provider and patient racial and ethnic
data further the goal of ensuring that MCOs take into account the
special bond between minority providers and minority patients.
267. Liang, supra note 256, at 858.
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